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Employment Discrimination

by Peter Reed Corbin*
and
Richard L. Ruth*
The 1998 survey period presented an extremely active year in the
employment discrimination arena, not only for the Eleventh Circuit, but
also for the United States Supreme Court.' Three key decisions were
rendered by the Supreme Court on sexual harassment and same-sex
discrimination, and another decision was rendered on the arbitrability
of ADA claims. Yet, ironically, in this year of inordinate Supreme Court
activity in the field of labor and employment law, the Court's arbitration
decision did not "live up to the hype" of being a landmark decision on the
legality of mandatory predispute arbitration of statutory discrimination
claims. On the Eleventh Circuit level, the court was presented with
several issues of first impression in the area of unlawful retaliation and
was also active in the application of the Supreme Court's new liability
standard for sexual harassment. In all, as the following survey article
will highlight, it was another busy year in the employment law realm in
the Eleventh Circuit, with several noteworthy decisions being rendered.
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1.

This Article will cover significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law

decided by the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit during the calendar year 1998. Cases arising under the following
federal statutes are included: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-718 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") §§ 2-15 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§§

2000e-2000e-17, and scattered section (1994 & Supp. 1996)); the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") § 1-108 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117
(1994)), and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)).
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TITLE VII OF THE CVL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof

1. Disparate Treatment Cases. In Jones v. Bessemer Carraway
Medical Center,2 the Eleventh Circuit Court affirmed a district court's
entrance of judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant employer
on plaintiff's racial discrimination claim.' In that case plaintiff, a
nurse, arrived on duty in personal clothing, and not in proper nursing
attire.4 Despite numerous supervisors telling plaintiff that she was
tardy and needed to change immediately, plaintiff failed to do so.'
Eventually, plaintiff was terminated for insubordination and being
unprepared for work.' Afterwards, plaintiff filed a racial discrimination
claim, but the district court granted the employer's motion for judgment
as a matter of law.7
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. s The court first held that
plaintiff failed to identify any similarly situated white employees who
were treated differently from plaintiff for similar offenses.9 While
plaintiff pointed to nonterminated white employees who had taken
vacation days despite being denied their requests, the employer pointed
out that due to the frequency of such occurrences, those situations were
treated as violations of the employer's attendance policy and not as
insubordination.' ° The court reaffirmed the employer's right to
interpret its rules in this reasonable fashion and noted that plaintiff
failed to offer any evidence that there was any discriminatory treatment
between classes of employees under that interpretation." Moreover,
the court held that other instances of misconduct, such as medication
errors, were too unrelated to the issues involved in the instant action to
satisfy the "similarly situated" requirement of plaintiff's prima facie
case." Because the court concluded that plaintiff had failed to satisfy

2. 137 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 1998).
3. Id. at 1309.
4. Id.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id. at 1309-10.
Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1311.
Id.
Id. at 1311-12.
Id. at 1312.
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all of the elements of her prima facie case, the court affirmed the district
court's order. 3
In a later partially-superseding opinion, the court in Jones14 also held
that plaintiff failed to present any sufficient "direct" evidence of discrimination. 5 While plaintiff presented evidence that her immediate supervisor,
who had first told her to change her attire, had frequently used disparaging
remarks in the workplace about her race, the court held that plaintiff failed
to demonstrate how those remarks played any role in plaintiff's termination
by upper management.' 6 The court noted that there was no evidence that
the supervisor's misconduct report to her superiors was motivated by any
discriminatory animus, and that there was no evidence that the decisionmakers themselves had ever made any racially disparaging comments or
remarks. 7 Consequently, the court affirmed that the "direct evidence"
method of proof did not apply to plaintiff's racial discrimination claim.' 8
In Harper v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corp., 9 the court reaffirmed
that an employer's grooming policy, which prohibited men, but not women
from wearing long hair did not violate Title VII.L' While the predecessor
Fifth Circuit had previously rendered a similar holding,2 ' the Eleventh
Circuit expressly adopted that prior precedent, falling in line with
numerous other circuits that have addressed the issue.2 2 Finally, noting
the vast amount of caselaw weighing against the male plaintiffs on their
gender discrimination claims challenging defendant employer's hair policy,
the court ruled that they had no protection under Title Vii's antiretaliation
provision because the objective belief standard could not be satisfied.'
Issues pertaining to both "direct evidence" and "circumstantial evidence"
of racial discrimination were addressed by the court in Carter v. Three
Springs Residential Treatment. 4 In Carter plaintiff brought a Title VII
action for racial discrimination after he was denied a promotion in favor of
a white employee.' As part of his claim, plaintiff alleged that a statement made to him by one of his superiors to the effect that she had

13.
14.
15.

Id. at 1313.
151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1323.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18.

Id. at 1323-24.

19.

139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998).

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 1386-87; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
139 F.3d at 1388.
Id.
132 F.3d 635, 637 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 639-40.
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"identified a bias against blacks" constituted direct evidence of unlawful
discrimination with respect to the promotional decision.26 Moreover,
plaintiff adduced alleged circumstantial evidence of unlawful racial
discrimination. 7 Nonetheless, the district court granted defendantemployer's motion for summary judgment after concluding that plaintiff
failed to provide sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination to support his claim.2
However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's order.' As
to the direct evidence issue, the court agreed that the referenced comment
was not direct evidence of discrimination because the comment could be
interpreted in several different ways, thereby failing to satisfy the legal
definition of "direct evidence."3 On the other hand, on circumstantial
evidence, the court concluded that plaintiff presented ample evidence to
establish a prima facie case and to raise an inference of pretext on the
employer's proffered reasons for the promotion decision.3' For example,
plaintiff demonstrated that the employer failed to follow its own internal
promotional opportunity system with respect to the disputed position, and
that the employer appeared to waive or modify several minimum qualifications for the successful candidate.32 Thus, based upon this evidence, the
court determined that a jury was a proper arbitrator of the dispute rather
than the district court on summary judgment.13
In Berman v. Orkin ExterminatingCo.,' the Eleventh Circuit reversed
a district court's judgment in favor of an employer on plaintiff's retaliation
claim. 5 The district court had granted judgment to defendant employer
on the retaliation claim after concluding that plaintiff had presented no
evidence that the managers charged with making the adverse employment
decisions against him were involved in, or were aware of, plaintiff's prior
EEOC complaint alleging religious discrimination.36 In reversing the
district court's decision, however, the court ruled that plaintiff did establish
a causal connection between the adverse employment action taken against
him and the filing of his EEOC charge, noting the district court overlooked
key testimony regarding managerial awareness of the EEOC charge and

26.
27.

Id. at 642.
Id. at 643-44.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 641.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 641-42.
Id. at 642-45.
Id.
Id. at 645.

34. 160 F.3d 697 (11th Cir. 1998).
35. Id. at 699.
36. Id. at 700-01.
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the fact that plaintiff was transferred twice by those managers within the
two months following his charge.3 7 Consequently, a jury verdict rendered
in favor of plaintiff on the retaliation claim was reinstated. 38
In another retaliation case, Clover v. Total System Services, Inc.,' the
court reversed a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on her retaliation claim
arising out of a sexual harassment context.' In that case plaintiff was
a witness for an internal sexual harassment investigation. Plaintiff also
had a history of tardiness with defendant company and was even late for
the meeting to discuss instances of sexual harassment. Soon after the
meeting occurred plaintiff was terminated for her tardiness. Plaintiff
brought a retaliation action, and a jury rendered a verdict in her favor.4'
The Eleventh Circuit, when vacating the jury verdict, determined that
plaintiff failed to sufficiently establish a cause of action for retaliation
under either the "opposition clause "42 or the "participation clause"' of
Title vIrs antiretaliation provision." First, the court concluded that the
instances of supposed sexual harassment that plaintiff witnessed were a
"country mile" away from constituting unlawful harassment. 45 Therefore,
plaintiff's belief that she was opposing an unlawful employment practice
was not objectively reasonable, thereby resulting in plaintiff's failing to
trigger antiretaliation protections under the opposition clause.46 As to the
participation clause, the court carefully studied the legislative history and
intent behind Title VII before determining that participation in a purely
internal, unlawful discrimination investigation did not constitute a
protected activity under Title VII's antiretaliation provision." The court
conceded that valid policy grounds existed to protect this participation but
held that the matter was for Congress to address, and not the court, given
the clear statutory language of Title VII.' Therefore, defendant employer
was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's retaliation
9
claim.

4

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 702.
Id.
157 F.3d 824 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 825.
Id. at 826.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
157 F.3d at 827-31.
Id. at 828.
Id.
Id. at 829-31.
Id. at 830-31.
Id. at 831.
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In a retaliation case of first impression, the court, in Wideman v. WalMart Stores, Inc.,5° was required to determine whether adverse employment actions that did not rise to the level of an "ultimate employment
decision" could still constitute a violation of Title VIrs antiretaliation
provision. 1 In Wideman plaintiff, shortly after filing an EEOC complaint,
was subjected to several reprimands even though she had never received
a reprimand prior to the filing of the complaint. Plaintiff was also
subjected to derogatory comments and was not provided timely medical
treatment by the employer after suffering an allergic reaction at work. 2
Yet the employer argued, and the district court agreed, that these
employment actions were not ultimate employment decisions, and
therefore, did not implicate Title VII retaliation concerns.' Nonetheless,
the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that Title VI's protection against
retaliatory discrimination extended to adverse actions that fell short of
ultimate employment decisions such as discharge and failure to hire
scenarios." Consequently, the court ordered a jury trial on the merits of
the retaliation claim.55
In Walker v. Mortham," the court was required to address whether
"relative qualifications" play any role in the establishment of a prima facie
case of employment discrimination under Title VII. 57 In that case the
district court determined that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie
case of employment discrimination because they did not demonstrate they
were as qualified or more qualified than successful applicants vying for
their coveted positions." The Eleventh Circuit reversed on appeal and
resolved conflicting precedent by holding that a plaintiff is not required to
establish as part of the prima facie case that the successful applicant for
his or her coveted position is less than or equally qualified to hold the
position.59 On the other hand, the court noted that a plaintiff may be
forced to address relative qualifications if the defendant presents them to
rebut the plaintiffs presumption of discrimination." Thus, the case was

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

141 F.3d 1453 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1455-56.
Id. at 1455.
Id. at 1455-56.
Id. at 1456-57.
Id. at 1457.
158 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1181-82.
Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1193.

60. Id.

1999]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

975

remanded for the district court to apply the proper legal standard to
plaintiffs' employment discrimination action.61
In Ross v. Rhodes Furniture,Inc.,62 the court, in a racial discrimination
case, reversed a district court's order granting defendant employer's
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury verdict was
rendered in favor of plaintiff.' Plaintiff, who was an exemplary employee
in charge of deliveries for a furniture store, was allegedly terminated for
soliciting tips.64 Yet after a review of the evidence, the court disagreed
with the district court and determined that plaintiff presented sufficient
evidence that the employer's proffered reason for terminating him was
pretextual.'
For example, plaintiff had presented evidence that the
supervisor who terminated him had himself received tips.' Plaintiff also
established that the decision-making managers occasionally made
derogatory racial remarks.6 7 While the court noted that these remarks
were too isolated and remote in time to constitute direct evidence of
discrimination against plaintiff, they could be used as circumstantial
evidence of discrimination.' Consequently, the court reinstated the jury
verdict in favor of plaintiff.69
2. Sexual Harassment and Same-Sex Harassment. The United
States Supreme Court became very active in the sexual harassment field
during the survey period with its "twin" decisions in Faragherv. City of
Boca Raton7" and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.7' Because both
decisions involved similar facts, one "rule" was used to decide both cases on
the issue of liability for harassment committed by supervisors.
In Faragherthe Supreme Court was faced with a factual scenario in
which a lower to mid-level supervisor created a hostile work environment
for plaintiff who never reported the conduct to upper management.
Specifically, plaintiff, a lifeguard, maintained that her supervisors had
created a sexually hostile atmosphere at work by repeatedly subjecting her
and other female lifeguards to uninvited and offensive touching, by making

61. Id. at 1194.
62. 146 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 1998).

63. Id. at 1288.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1291.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1292.
118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).

71.

118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
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rude remarks, and by speaking of women in offensive terms.72 Following
a bench trial, the district court concluded that the supervisors' conduct was
discriminatory harassment severe enough to alter the conditions of
plaintiff's employment and create an abusive working environment.7 ' The
district court further ruled that defendant employer was liable for the
harassment because plaintiff's supervisors, although not technically upper
management of defendant, were nonetheless acting as defendant's agents
when they committed the harassing acts.74
However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision of the district court,
holding that plaintiff's supervisors were not acting within the scope of their
employment when they engaged in the harassing conduct, that their agency
relationship with defendant did not facilitate the harassment, that
constructive knowledge of the harassment could not be imputed to
defendant because of its pervasiveness or the supervisors' knowledge, and
that defendant could not be held liable for negligence in failing to prevent
it.75 Thus, plaintiff appealed her case to the Supreme Court, which agreed
to decide the issue of liability for the supervisors' harassing conduct.76
Similarly, in Ellerth plaintiff, who worked as a salesperson in one of
defendant employer's divisions, alleged that she was subjected to constant
sexual harassment by her supervisor, who was a mid-level manager in
defendant's managerial hierarchy.77 The supervisor had authority to
make hiring and promotion decisions, albeit subject to the approval of his
supervisors who signed the paperwork. However, according to defendant's
upper management, the harassing supervisor's position was not considered
an upper-level management position, and was not in the policy-making
hierarchy. Finally, the harassing supervisor was not plaintiff's immediate
supervisor, being one level higher in the hierarchy. Ultimately, plaintiff
allegedly quit because of the harassing supervisor's behavior.78
The district court granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's
claims, noting that during her tenure with defendant, plaintiff did not
inform anyone in authority about the supervisor's conduct, despite knowing
that defendant had a policy against sexual harassment.79 Thus, while the
district court found that the harassing supervisor's behavior was severe and
pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment, it also found that

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2280-81.
Id. at 2281.
Id.
Id. at 2281-82.
Id. at 2282.

77. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2262.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2263.
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defendant "neither knew nor should have known about the conduct," and
thus entered judgment in favor of defendant.8 °
After plaintiff appealed, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's
decision, producing in the process eight separate opinions with different
rationales. 8' While the judges seemed to agree that the harassing
supervisor's unfulfilled threats to deny plaintiff tangible job benefits was
sufficient to impose vicarious liability on defendant, the judges' consensus
disintegrated on the standard for establishing an employer's liability for
this type of claim.82 Thus, defendant appealed to the Supreme Court and
presented the Court with the issue of whether defendant could be held
vicariously liable for the harassing supervisor's alleged conduct.'
Given the similarity of the issues presented to the Supreme Court in both
Faragherand Ellerth, the Court issued virtually identical holdings in each
case. As a preliminary matter, while still acknowledging the relevance of
terming harassment as either quid pro quo or hostile work environment for
purposes of determining the threshold question of whether a plaintiff can
prove discrimination in violation of Title VII, the Court nonetheless held
that those terms were not controlling on the issue of vicarious liability.'
Rather, the holdings instead focused on the imposition of vicarious liability
for misuse of supervisory authority under either category.' At the outset,
the Court held that without question, when a supervisor uses his
supervisory authority to commit sexual harassment and takes a tangible
employment action against a subordinate, vicarious liability will automatically result.' This holding is consistent with the Court's prior holding in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 7 However, the issue most troubling to
the Court was whether the agency relationship, used for purposes of
determining vicarious liability, aids in commission of supervisory harassment that does not culminate in a tangible employment action.' The
Court noted that "[oin the one hand, a supervisor's power and authority
invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular threatening
character, and in this sense, the supervisor always is aided by the agency
relation."89 On the other hand, the Court acknowledged that "there are
acts of harassment a supervisor might commit which might be the same

80. Id.
81. Id.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 2264.

84. Id.
85. Id.; Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2284-94.
86.
87.

Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
477 U.S. 57 (1986).

88. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2269-70.
89. Id. at 2269.
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acts a co-employee would commit, and there may be some circumstances
where the supervisor's status makes little difference.' J
In the final analysis, the Court focused on Title VIrs intent "to encourage
the creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms. "
The Court noted that Title VII has primarily a deterrent
purpose-encouraging employees to report harassing conduct before it
becomes severe and pervasive and encouraging employers to create
mechanisms in the workplace to avoid harm to potential victims of
discrimination.92 Thus, the Court stated that "a theory of vicarious
liability for misuse of supervisory power would be at odds with the
statutory policy if it failed to provide employers with some [incentive to
attempt to avoid unlawful harassment in the first place].' On the other
hand, the Court desired to avoid further litigation over issues of whether
affirmative or implicit uses of supervisory authority were used to effectuate
harassing conduct for purposes of determining employer liability. 4
Consequently, to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability
for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, while on the other
hand acknowledging Title VII's equally basic policies of encouraging
preventive maintenance by employers and reporting by harassed employees, the C6urt, in both Faragherand Ellerth, adopted the following rule:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for
an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate
(or successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible
employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an
affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b)that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an employer had
promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedures is not
necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated
policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be
addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense.
And while proof that an employee failed to fufill the corresponding
obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the

90. Id.
91. Id. at 2270.

92. Id.
93. Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2292.

94. Id. at 2291-92.
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employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy
the employer's burden under the second element of the defense. No
affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment.'
Therefore, in Ellerth the Court remanded the case to the district court to
give plaintiff an adequate opportunity to prove that she had a sexual
harassment claim for which defendant was liable.' Similarly, in Faragher the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and found that plaintiff had
presented a compelling case of sexual harassment for which the employer
was liable.9 Specifically, the Court noted that defendant took few
precautions to prevent such harassment and wholly failed to communicate
a formal policy against harassment that contained a sensible complaint
procedure.9' Finally, the Court stated that the harassing supervisors in
Faragherwere given virtually unchecked authority over their subordinates,
directly controlling and supervising all aspects of plaintiff's day-to-day
activities. 9 Based on these facts, the Court held as a matter of law that
defendant could not meet the new liability standard enunciated in the
case. 100

In another significant decision, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.,01 the Supreme Court ruled that "same-sex" harassment can be
actionable under Title VII. ° In that case a male plaintiff was subjected
to numerous sex-related humiliating actions against him by other male
employees and by his male supervisor."°
Relying on Fifth Circuit
precedent, the district court determined that plaintiff, as a male, had no
cause of action under Title VII for harassment by male co-workers."°
The Fifth Circuit, recognizing its own precedent, affirmed the district
court's decision on appeal.'0 5
However, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded."°
Using a
process of elimination, by analyzing prior Title VII caselaw and Title VIrs
legislative history, the Court could find no justification for a "categorical

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 2292-93; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2271.
Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2294.
Id. at 2293-94.
Id. at 2293.
Id. at 2293-94.
118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1001.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1003.
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rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title
VII." 1°7 Rather, the Court concluded that Title VII precludes discrimination based on sex of any kind."~ Thus, the Court ruled that so long as
a plaintiff in a same-sex harassment action can prove discrimination
"because of sex," the claim was viable under Title VII. °
At the Eleventh Circuit level, the court in Coates v. Sundor Brands,
Inc."0 considered a situation in which plaintiff alleged that a supervisor's
inaction with respect to a hostile work environment created by co-worker
sexual harassment facilitated, prolonged, or otherwise failed to arrest the
harassment. In that case, plaintiff initially complained to a co-employee
about another employee's sexual harassment. After the complaint was
brought to the attention of defendant's human resource manager, the
offender was confronted and counseled. Thereafter, the human resource
manager repeatedly asked plaintiff if there was anything wrong or if the
problem was taken care of, to which questions plaintiff responded that
everything was fine. In reality, however, plaintiff was still experiencing
sexual harassment. Eventually, plaintiff complained again to upper
management, at which time the offender was terminated. Yet plaintiff
herself took a medical leave of absence and later resigned. Plaintiff
subsequently brought suit against defendant company alleging hostile work
environment and sexual harassment in violation of Title VII." The
district court granted summary judgment to defendant company and
plaintiff appealed. 112

The Eleventh Circuit noted that it was "not unmindful" of the "enormous
difficulties" involved in lodging sexual harassment complaints and the
"great psychological burden" it places on the victim of the harassment."'
Nonetheless, the court agreed that there was no genuine issue that plaintiff
had acted reasonably to put the company on notice of her problem or that
once the company finally was given notice, it had acted unreasonably in its
response."' Interestingly, there is no mention of the Supreme Court's
Faragher and Ellerth opinions in the panel majority opinion. In a
concurring opinion, however, Circuit Judge Barkett expressed the view that
the case was controlled by Faragherand Ellerth,"5 and that the employer

107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1001-02.
Id. at 1002.
Id.

110.

164 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 1999).

111.
112.

Id. at 1363.
Id.

113. Id. at 1366.
114. Id.

115.

Id.
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of proving the affirmative defense
had adequately carried its burden
116
enunciated in those opinions.
In Llampallas v. Mini-CircuitsLab, Inc.,"7 the court analyzed both the
issue of who is an "employer" under Title VII and whether an employer was
liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment. In that case, two lesbian women
who had a long-term relationship worked together at defendant company
in a supervisor-subordinate role and also served without compensation on
a condominium association board, along with defendant company's
president. However, after the women's relationship ended acrimoniously,
plaintiff's former partner, who was also her supervisor, allegedly began to
sexually harass her. After the company's president became involved in the
women's disputes, he attempted to find another management position for
plaintiff because the former partner informed the president that she could
no longer work with plaintiff. Yet when it was determined that another
position could not be found for plaintiff, she was terminated. Additionally,
the president and former partner acted together to force plaintiff off the
condominium association board." 8
After a bench trial, the district court concluded the former partner had
engaged in quid pro quo sexual harassment of plaintiff, and thus,
defendant company was strictly liable." 9 Given the close relationship
between defendant company and the association's officers, the district court
also concluded that defendant condominium association was liable as a
"joint employer" for plaintiff's removal from the board. ° Defendants
then appealed the district court's findings.2
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and first held the condominium
association could not be considered plaintiff's employer for purposes of Title
VII because plaintiff received no compensation for serving on the association's board." Moreover, the court determined the association was not
a "joint employer" of plaintiff because the association had no control over
plaintiff's terms and conditions of employment at defendant company where
she was truly employed.'2
As to defendant company, the court held it could not be strictly liable to
plaintiff for her discharge because there was no evidence that any sexual
harassment suffered by plaintiff at the hands of her supervisor and former

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 1370.
163 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1239-40.
Id. at 1241.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1244-45.
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partner was communicated to the company's president or was a factor in
his discharge of plaintiff. 24 The court noted that the company's president
was merely told that the two women could no longer work together because
of personal matters and after unsuccessfully attempting to find an
alternative position for plaintiff, chose to retain plaintiff's former partner
instead."2 Finally, in releasing the company from liability, the court
emphasized the fact that the former partner and alleged harasser was not
in any way the decision-maker in plaintiffs termination.'w As a result,
the court ruled that plaintiff's Title VII claim must fail because she failed
to prove that she was discriminated against because of her sex."2
In Womack v. Runyon,' the court affirmed a district court's order
granting defendant employer's motion to dismiss in a scenario in which the
male plaintiff was passed over for a promotion in favor of a female coemployee because of her sexual relationship with the decision-making
supervisor."2 The court, relying upon prior caselaw, as well as a policy
guidance letter issued by the EEOC, held that preferential treatment based
upon consensual romantic relationships does not violate Title VII because
both men and women alike are disadvantaged for reasons other than their
genders.13
Consequently, the court concluded that the district court
correctly dismissed plaintiff's Title VII claim.''
Finally, in Mendoza v. Borden, Inc.,132 the court reversed a district
court's directed verdict in favor of defendant employer in a sexual
harassment case and held that plaintiff did establish her burden of proof
under the Faragherand Ellerth decisions that shifted the burden to the
employer to prove the affirmative defense to liability.1" Plaintiff presented evidence that the highest ranking executive at the employer's regional
facility constantly followed her around, stared at her, "look[ed] her up and
down in a sexually suggestive manner," made suggestive sounds, and
rubbed his hip against hers while touching her shoulder."3 While the
employer argued that this conduct amounted only to sporadic and
innocuous interactions with no abusive overtones, the court disagreed,
holding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to survive a motion for
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directed verdict."3 Consequently, the matter was remanded so employer
could attempt to establish the Faragher/Ellerthaffirmative defense to
sexual harassment liability.1"
B.

Proceduraland Evidentiary Matters

1. Res Judicata/Collateral EstoppeL In Pleming v. UniversalRundle Corp.,"s7 the court was required to resolve a unique issue involving application of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to an
employment discrimination action. In Pleming plaintiff brought an action
against her employer, claiming racial discrimination after the employer
refused to transfer her into an available clerical position after she suffered
a back injury in her current position.'l s
During discovery, plaintiff
became aware of two other similar clerical positions that were available
and filled by other employees."
Although plaintiff did not amend her
complaint to claim discrimination for not being hired into the two other
available positions, the two other positions were repeatedly mentioned
throughout the litigation of the matter."4 Nevertheless, the district court
granted summary judgment to the employer on plaintiff's discrimination
claim, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.""
However, plaintiff filed a second lawsuit based on defendant employer's
failure to transfer plaintiff into the two other clerical positions."
The
district court dismissed the second lawsuit on the grounds of res judicata
and collateral estoppel, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed on appeal. 1"
The court held that even though the two other clerical positions were
referenced in the previous case, no claim of discrimination was actually
asserted during the first case with respect to those positions that would
invoke the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 1" Furthermore, the court noted that plaintiff was not aware of the two positions until
aftr the first action was commenced.'"
Finally, a legal action for
retaliation was stated in the second action, which was not present in the
first lawsuit, and thus, res judicata and collateral estoppel could not apply
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to that cause of action."4 Therefore, the court ruled that plaintiff's
second 7 employment discrimination action could proceed in the district
14
court.

2. Consent Decrees. In United States v. City of Hialeah,"4 the
court affirmed a district court's refusal to approve part of a consent decree
entered into between the United States Department of Justice and a
defendant municipality as settlement of an employment discrimination
action. 49 In that case, the Department and defendant city entered into
a consent decree, part of which granted victims of employment discrimination retroactive seniority rights.' 50 Yet no negotiations were conducted
with adversely-affected employees who could have possibly lost seniority
rights under the decree, and no trial was held on the issues of discrimination or appropriate and necessary remedies. 151 Under that set of facts,
the court concluded that the district court's action was proper because the
adversely-affected employees had a right to object to the consent decree and
participate in an adjudication of appropriate and necessary remedies in
order to protect legally enforceable rights guaranteed to them by their
collective bargaining agreement.'5 2
3. Sanctions. In Barnes v. Dalton," the court affirmed a district
court's award of sanctions against plaintiffs' attorney in an employment
discrimination action.M In that action, plaintiffs' attorney repeatedly
filed a complaint containing claims that he knew or should have known
were time-barred, repeatedly failed to perfect service upon defendant, and
filed and pursued a motion for default despite knowledge that service had
not been perfected. Plaintiffs' attorney also repeatedly filed a class action
complaint that did not comply with local rules and repeatedly filed a
complaint containing claims of pattern and practice and disparate impact
racial discrimination without any evidence to support such theories of
recovery.'55 Finally, the court rejected the attorney's argument that the
district court could not award defendant its expert witness's fees' as a
sanction and affirmed the district court's sanctions in their entirety."
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On the other hand, in Sayers v. Stewart Sleep Center, Inc.,57 the court
reversed a district court's award of attorney fees against a plaintiff in favor
of a prevailing defendant in a sexual harassment action.1i Although the
jury rendered an award for defendant, the district court determined that
plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination and determined
that her claim was not frivolous. 9 However, those factors aside, the
district court concluded that plaintiff's claims were unreasonable and
without foundation, especially in light of plaintiff's demand of damages in
the astronomical amount of thirty-four million dollars.' 6° On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed and held the district court's initial determination
on satisfaction of a prima facie case rendered an award of fees against
plaintiff inappropriate. 16 ' Finally, the court ruled that it was inappropriate for the district court to consider the amount requested by plaintiff when
determining defendant's entitlement to fees."6
4. Pre-Suit Arbitration. In Paladinov. Avnet Computer Technologies,
Inc.," the court ruled that a predispute mandatory arbitration clause of
employment disputes was unenforceable on a plaintiff's Title VII claim
when the language of the clause was ambiguous and the clause "completely
proscrib[ed] an arbitral award of Title VII damages.""6 In that case,
plaintiff signed a handbook provision mandating that arbitration be used
to settle any controversy or claim arising out of, or relating to, plaintiff's
employment or termination thereof. 165 Another portion of the arbitration
agreement, however, authorized the arbitrator to award damages only for
a breach of contract and stated that the arbitrator had no authority to
make an award of any other damages."6 The Eleventh Circuit, after
analyzing the language of the agreement, as well as prior caselaw, agreed
with the district court that the clause was too ambiguous to include Title
VII statutory claims within its purview in light of the limited language
authorizing an arbitrator to award damages only for breach of contract
claims. 167 Additionally, the court noted that even if the language could
be construed to include Title VII claims, the limitation of damages rendered

157. 140 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 1998).
158. Id. at 1354.
159. Id. at 1353.
160. Id. at 1353-54.
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the clause unenforceable on federal statutory claims . Therefore, the
district court's
denial of the employer's motion to compel arbitration was
169
affirmed.
5. Administrative Prerequisites to Suit. In Crawford v. Babbitt,7 ° the court addressed the issue of exhaustion of administrative
remedies when compensatory damages'are requested against a federal
government employer in an employment discrimination context. In that
case, a federal employee's claim for compensatory damages against her
employing agency was dismissed by the district court on the ground that
the employee failed to adequately raise the issue in administrative
proceedings, thereby failing to satisfy the administrative exhaustion
requirement with respect to her claim for compensatory damages.'
However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, determining that pursuant to the
express language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,7 as well as principles
of sovereign immunity and its waiver, both a federal agency and an
aggrieved employee have a right to a jury trial on the issue of compensatory damages in employment discrimination scenarios.'
Thus, because
the Eleventh Amendment prohibits an award of compensatory damages
against a federal agency in administrative proceedings, the court held that
no administrative exhaustion requirements were present with respect to
that issue, thereby rejecting the EEOC's position on the matter.74
75
6. Trial Procedure. In Barnett v. General Electric Capital Corp.,
the court was faced with plaintiff's attempt to withdraw her consent to
have her employment discrimination action tried before a magistrate judge.
At a pretrial conference, plaintiff's attorney represented to the magistrate
judge that he would advise that she consent to trial before the magistrate,
and that he did not foresee any problems with that consent. 76 Yet after
the court proceeded to make arrangements for trial before the magistrate
judge, plaintiff herself refused to consent to such a trial. 1 7 7 Nonetheless,
the district court ruled that plaintiff, through her attorney's representa17
tions, waived her right to adjudication before an Article III judge.
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After a jury verdict was rendered79 in favor of the employer, plaintiff
appealed the district court's ruling.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the jury verdict, holding that plaintiff's
attorney's representations could not have been read to convey unequivocal,
unambiguous consent to have her case tried before a magistrate judge." °
Rather, these representations seemed to imply only that the attorney would
recommend to plaintiff that the case be tried before a magistrate judge.'
Thus, absent explicit consent, the court concluded the jury verdict had to
be vacated and the matter tried before an Article III judge.'8 2
II.
A

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AcT

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof

Several cases during the survey period related to reductions in force
("RIFs") pursuant to the Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA7)." In most instances the employer prevailed, although several
procedural paths were followed in obtaining that result.
For example, in Standard v. A-B.E.L. Services, Inc.,'8 4 the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer in an RIF
case pursuant to the ADEA. 8 4 The company, Plaster Concepts, Inc., was
engaged in the production and sale of decorative architectural pieces, such
as cornices, columns, and ceiling panels. Each of these pieces was produced
by casting them from certain molds. The company maintained two
different departments, the tooling department that crafted the molds, and
the production department that used the molds to make the finished
products. Plaintiff was hired as a mold-maker in the tooling department
at age forty-nine. However, Plaster Concepts experienced a drop in
business due to the expiration of several large contracts, and the decision
was made that four workers in the production department and one worker
in the tooling department would have to be laid off. Plaintiff was chosen
as the least valuable of the several choices in the tooling department and
accordingly was laid off.' 86 The district court, finding that plaintiff had
produced no evidence to show the employer's lay-off decision was a pretext
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for a7 discriminatory motive, granted summary judgment for the employ8
er.1
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that summary judgment was
proper and found that plaintiff had not even presented a prima facie
case."
The only evidence of any discriminatory intent was part of a
conversation by a supervisor that plaintiff overheard in which the
supervisor had said, "'Older people have more go wrong.'"' 9 However,
the court of appeals found that this "conversation fragment, devoid of any
meaningful context," was too vague to prove any type of discriminatory
animus. 90 The court also found it important that the supervisor who had
allegedly made the statement had not been a decision-maker with regard
to the decision to terminate plaintiff.''
In Watkins v. Sverdrup Technology, Inc.," 9 plaintiffs' RIF case at least
made it to trial, but after the jury could not reach a verdict, the district
court granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant
to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1" Sverdrup was a
large defense contractor that provided research, development, and testing
of conventional weapons systems for the United States Air Force at Eglin
Air Force Base in Florida. Plaintiffs were two engineers for Sverdrup and
had a particular expertise in laser radar and infra-red weapons systems.
However, the Air Force changed its focus to inertial and satellite-guided
weapons after the Persian Gulf War, when it learned that infra-red and
laser radar-guided weapons did not function well in smoke or at night. As
a result, plaintiffs were two of eight engineers laid off by Sverdrup.
However, within the same month that these layoffs occurred, Sverdrup
hired ten new employees skilled in the newly-emerging weapons technology-"
Following a mistrial by the jury, the district court entered judgment as a matter of law for the employer.195
On appeal, the court assumed plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing
and focused on whether a sufficient showing had been made for a
reasonable jury to find that the RIF was simply a pretext for intentional
age discrimination. The court found that no jury question existed on this
issue."s As to the statistical data presented by plaintiffs, the Eleventh
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Circuit found that it "painted an incomplete picture." 97 Although
plaintiffs presented evidence that the average age of the discharged
engineers was 54.4 and that the average age of the new hires was 30.9, the
court pointed to evidence of numerous employees well over forty who were
retained after the RIF." Further, there was no evidence of the average
age before and after the RIF.'" Finally, the court found that plaintiffs
had presented no evidence of discriminatory treatment on similarlysituated employees. 2" The court concluded that the new engineers hired
by defendant never "replaced" plaintiffs because they possessed entirely
new and distinct skills and because the skills possessed by plaintiffs were
obsolete and outdated.2 "' Accordingly, the court of appeals found that
judgment had properly been entered for the employer.0 2
In 71ldwell v. Carter Products,"3 plaintiff went even one step further
in the district court, actually obtaining a favorable jury verdict for lost
wages and benefits amounting to sixty thousand dollars, as well as an
equal amount in liquidated damages. 4 Plaintiff was a district sales
manager for Carter Products, which manufactured and sold health and
beauty-care products. Plaintiff was laid off at age fifty as part of a
nationwide reduction in force. Plaintiff, who worked out of Tampa, Florida,
presented evidence that he had worked for the employer for twenty-one
years, and his accounts were assumed by a twenty-six year old individual
based in Miami, Florida, who had only one year of experience with the
company. 5 This was enough evidence to convince the jury, but not the
Eleventh Circuit. The employer had presented evidence that plaintiff was
only one of twelve individuals selected for layoff and that the average age
of its sales force had actually increased slightly after the RIF.2" The
court of appeals concluded that plaintiff could not establish pretext by
simply presenting evidence of his disagreement with the employer's
decision to eliminate the Tampa territory and to retain the Miami territory
(along with its twenty-six-year-old manager).2 7 Finding the evidence
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insufficient to support the jury's verdict, the court of appeals
reversed and
2
directed the entry of judgment in favor of the employer. N
In Williams v. Vitro Services Corp.,2° the Eleventh Circuit considered
the impact of "same actor" evidence in the context of a RIF case pursuant
to the ADEA. In that case, the supervisor, who terminated plaintiff as part
of a RIF at age sixty, was the same individual who had originally hired
plaintiff at age forty-nine.21
The district court granted summary
judgment for the employer, finding no prima facie case had been presented.2 1 The Eleventh Circuit, in a case of first impression, declined to find
that the "same actor" circumstance warranted a presumption that
discrimination was absent from the termination decision, but did find that
the evidence gave rise to a permissible inference that there was no
discriminatory motive with respect to the termination. 21 However,
finding that the weight to be accorded the inference was a matter for the
jury to decide rather than the court, the court of appeals found that
summary
judgment was improperly granted and remanded the case for
213
trial.
214
In Bogle v. Orange County Board of County Commissioners,
the

Eleventh Circuit reviewed the standards for granting judgment as a matter
of law in an ADEA action pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.215 Plaintiff, a corrections officer for defendant Orange -County,
Florida, was fired from his job at the age of sixty-three, after having been
hired at the age of fifty-eight. He was allegedly fired for violating several
policies and ethics rules governing his conduct as a corrections officer.
After he was replaced by an individual approximately thirty years younger,
he brought an age discrimination action.21 At the close of plaintiff's case
at trial, the district court granted judgment for the county as a matter of
law, finding that plaintiff had neither established a prima facie case nor
cast any doubt on the county's asserted reasons for firing him .217

The,

court of appeals, in reliance upon the court's prior decision in Combs v.
21
PlantationPatterns,
focused its attention on the latter question. The
court found that Orange County was not entitled to a judgment as a matter
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of law if plaintiff "produced any evidence that would permit a reasonable
jury to disbelieve the proffered reasons for his discharge."2 ' The court
found none.' Although plaintiff alleged that he had been singled out for
selective discipline, no witness testified who had knowledge of the
disciplinary histories of other employees assertedly involved in similar
policy infractions. This, the court reasoned, amounted to "nothing more
than an allegation that a particular employee had broken a rule but had
never been caught."22 i
In Broaddus v. Florida Power Corp.,' the Eleventh Circuit examined
the admissibility of certain medical evidence in an ADEA action. Plaintiff,
an employee at a nuclear power plant in Crystal River, Florida, lost his job
as part of a department-wide reduction in force. He challenged his
termination in an action brought pursuant to both the ADEA and the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). 3 At the close
of the evidence, the district court granted Florida Power's motion for
judgment as a matter of law on the ERISA claim. 22' However, during the
trial the jury heard evidence that plaintiff had made substantial claims on
the company's medical policies. Plaintiff's counsel emphasized this evidence
during closing arguments, commenting that the RIF was "'designed to get
rid of the older higher priced employees,'" and "'With age goes increased
salary ... [and] increased benefits.'

22

During deliberations the jury

posed the following question to the court: "Since the second charge of
discrimination due to health issues was dismissed, can we consider any of
the evidence given prior to that ruling or is that evidence moot since that
issue has been dropped?"2 The district court, however, simply instructed the jury to give the medical evidence "such weight, if any, as you think
should be given in your consideration of age discrimination alone."227
On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit found that the ADEA claim
was improperly tainted by this medical evidence and granted a new
trial.'
Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins,'m the court emphasized that the ADEA "does not prohibit an
employer from making an employment decision on the basis of higher

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

162 F.3d at 658.
Id. at 659.
Id.
145 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1285; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
145 F.3d at 1285.
Id. at 1285-86.
Id. at 1286.
Id.
Id. at 1289.
507 U.S. 604 (1993).

992

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

salaries, increased benefits, pension status, or claims for medical expenses
even though these characteristics are often correlated with an employee's
age. " 23 The court found that even though this evidence may violate
ERISA, it does not constitute a violation of the ADEA.? ' The court
concluded that when the district court became aware the jury was
considering improper
evidence, it should have clarified this issue with a
2
proper instruction.
B.

ProceduralMatters

1. Class Actions. In Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp.,' the
Eleventh Circuit, in an en banc decision, considered an important issue
relating to the tolling of the statute of limitations in a class action pursuant
to the ADEA. The case involved thirty-one potential class members who
lost their jobs at Martin Marietta and contested their terminations with
age discrimination claims. The EEOC notified each of the individuals at
varying times that their charges were dismissed, thus triggering the
ninety-day period within which a lawsuit must be filed. 21 The court of
appeals referenced the Supreme Court's prior decision in Crown, Cork &
235
Seal Co. v. Parker,
which held that the commencement of a class action
tolled the running of the ninety-day limitations period for all members of
the putative class until class certification was denied. The specific issue
presented in Armstrong was whether "the statute of limitations begins to
run again immediately upon the district court's entry of the interlocutory
order denying class certification, or whether the statute remains tolled
through final judgment in the former class action and completion of an

230. 145 F.3d at 1287.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1287-88.
233. 138 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 1998).
234. Id. at 1378-79.
235. 462 U.S. 345 (1983). It should be noted that Crown, Cork & Seal was decided
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Curiously, in Armstrong the Eleventh
Circuit addressed the issue before the court as if it were addressing a Rule 23 class action.
However, the ADEA, in its remedial provisions, is based upon the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. I 1995 & II 1996), not Title VII. FLSA
class actions are dramatically different from Rule 23 class actions; that is, FLSA class
members must specifically "opt in" to the suit to be considered part of the class, whereas
Rule 23 class members specifically must "opt out" of the class in order to avoid being bound
by the court's ruling. However, there is no mention of this issue by the Eleventh Circuit
in Armstrong, nor is there any mention of the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989), which addressed the class notification
requirements for an ADEA "opt in" class action.
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appeal from the order denying class certification."'
In a lengthy
opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held that the tolling of the statute of
limitations ceased as soon as the district court enters an interlocutory order
denying class certification.2 37 Any other ruling, according to the court,
"would seriously contravene the policies underlying statutes of limitations"
and "would leave cases in limbo for years at a time."'
2. Attorney Fees. In Thrlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co.,2 the
Eleventh Circuit addressed the proper standard to be utilized in awarding
attorney fees to prevailing defendants in ADEA actions. In light of the
close relationship between the ADEA and the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA7), ° the court joined several other circuits in holding that
prevailing defendants in ADEA actions can be awarded fees only upon a
finding that the plaintiff litigated in bad faith (the same standard utilized
in FLSA actions).24
3.
Sovereign Immunity. The issue of Eleventh Amendment
immunity for suits under the ADEA was presented to the Eleventh Circuit
in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents.242 The Eleventh Amendment,'
of course, generally prohibits suits against a state or its agencies in federal
court. Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida,2' the court of appeals reasoned that Seminole
mandated two requirements before Congress could properly abrogate the
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, there had to be a "clear
legislative statement" of Congressional intent to abrogate the immunity;
second, Congress must have done so under proper constitutional authority.'
In rendering its decision, the Eleventh Circuit found no need to go
beyond the first requirement because the court found "tn]o unequivocal
expression of an intent to abrogate immunity" in the ADEn 24 Indeed,
the court found no reference to the Eleventh Amendment or to sovereign
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242. 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998).
243. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
244. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
245. 139 F.3d at 1429-30.
246. Id. at 1430-31.

994

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

immunity anywhere in the statute. 7 Accordingly, the court concluded
that the Eleventh Amendment entitles states to immunity from suits by
private citizens in federal court under the ADEA. 2
III.

AMERICANS WrrH DISABILrrms ACT

A

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof
When Congress initially enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 ("ADA), 2 49 the plaintiffs' bar was literally chomping at the bit to
parade their sympathetic clients in front of the typical American jury, with
visions of dollar signs gleefully dancing about in their thoughts. The
defense bar, on the other hand, experienced only nightmares and worried
about how to explain the anticipated multidigit verdicts to their clients.
However, as various ADA cases continue to make their way through the
court system, the reality of things has not quite worked out as either side
initially expected. Indeed, during the 1998 survey period, ADA plaintiffs
had considerable difficulty even getting to trial. In four separate ADA
cases considered by the Eleventh Circuit during the survey period,
summary judgments were affirmed when the plaintiff could not even
establish that his or her impairment constituted a disability under the Act.
In Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc.,"W the impairment at issue was
a back injury, including several herniated discs that plaintiff suffered on
the job while moving a heavy mold. After several months of treatment for
the injury, plaintiff returned to work. Several months later, he was laid off
as part of a reduction in force.25' The district court granted summary
judgment for the employer. 2 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed,
finding that plaintiff had merely proved the existence of a physical
impairment, but had presented no evidence of any limitation on a major life
activity.2" This, the court found, was insufficient to establish that
plaintiff had a disability under the Act.'
Because plaintiff had established no more than a temporary condition, a typical workers' compensation
injury that eventually healed sufficiently to allow him to resume work, the
court of appeals affirmed.'
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Similarly, in Mendoza v. Borden, Inc.,2 the impairment at issue was
a lifting restriction that prevented plaintiff from lifting objects over five to
seven pounds. Plaintiff asserted that the impairment substantially limited
her ability to perform the major life activity of working. However, no
evidence was presented to show that plaintiff could not perform a "broad
range or class of jobs," as opposed to plaintiff's particular job. 7 The
district court granted a directed verdict and the Eleventh Circuit again
agreed.m The court found that no reasonable jury could have considered
plaintiff disabled. 9
The major life activity of working was also the focus of attention in
Witter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.2 ° Plaintiff was a pilot with Delta Air
Lines who underwent a sequence of psychiatric examinations that resulted
in his being temporarily grounded. Ultimately, he was diagnosed by a
panel of psychiatrists as suffering from "Narcissistic Personality Disorder
and possible Cyclothymia." Based on this report, Delta permanently
grounded plaintiff. Plaintiff then sued Delta under the ADA, arguing he
had a mental impairment that substantially limited the major life activity
of working."' The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendent.2
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the ADA
regulations that define "substantially limited" when considering the major
life activity of working. These regulations make it clear that the impairment must involve a "class of jobs or a broad range of jobs" as opposed to
a plaintiff's inability to perform "a single, particular job." 3 Accordingly,
even if it were assumed that plaintiff was unable to pilot airplanes because
of his mental condition, this showing was insufficient to meet the definition
of "substantially imited."2 4 The court noted that there were numerous
nonpiloting jobs at Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport that plaintiff
might well be able to perform, such as "pilot ground trainer, flight
simulator trainer, flight instructor, aeronautical school instructor, as well
as executive, management, and administrative positions."' Accordingly,
the Eleventh Circuit agreed
21 that plaintiff had not established that he
disability.
a
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Perhaps the most creative attempt to establish a disability was presented
to the court in Swain v. Hillsborough County School Board. 7 Plaintiff
worked as both a teacher and an administrator in the Hillsborough County
school system. Plaintiff also suffered from incontinence. A change in
school policy prohibited plaintiff's students from leaving the classroom
between classes. This change in policy, in turn, restricted plaintiff's
opportunities to utilize the school restroom facilities. Plaintiff subsequently
brought suit under the ADA, alleging that her physical impairment
(incontinence) substantially limited the major life activity of working.'
The district court granted defendant summary judgment.2" On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit noted that plaintiff presented no evidence that she
could not perform a broader range or class of jobs, but that plaintiff had
simply made "the vague assertion that she is unable to perform any job
that precludes her from having regular access to a restroom." ° . The
court went on to note that were it "to accept this tautological reasoning, no
physical or mental impairment would fall outside the scope of the
ADA." 27' The court also found it significant that plaintiff somehow had
worked as a teacher and administrator for nearly thirty years, and during
272
that period, her ability to work was unaffected by her impairment.
Even if a plaintiff establishes a disability under the ADA, the plaintiff
then must establish that he is a "qualified individual" who can perform the
essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation.'
In two cases during the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit
addressed whether the plaintiff was a "qualified individual."
In LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc.," plaintiff worked as a line
cook for Duffy's, a bar and restaurant. Plaintiff suffered from epilepsy and
had a long history of seizures. His doctor restricted him from driving and
from operating heavy or dangerous machinery. On plaintiff's first night of
work, he suffered from two seizures--on one occasion he walked into a wall,
and later, during a second seizure, he walked into the dining room where
customers were present. As a line cook, plaintiff was required to cook on
a gas flat-top grill, use a fryolator filled with hot grease, and use slicing
machines. After about three months on the job, plaintiff was discharged,

267. 146 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 1998).
268. Id. at 856-57.
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273. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1995). See Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 447
(11th Cir. 1996).
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admittedly because of his epilepsy."5 Notwithstanding this admission,
the district court granted summary judgment for the employer, finding that
plaintiff had not established that he was a "qualified individual" under the
ADA.2"' On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit focused on whether plaintiff's
seizures on the job would have posed a risk of harm to himself and others
while performing the duties of line cook. The court found that it was
plaintiff's burden to establish that he was not a direct threat.277 Furthermore, the court found that the statement of plaintiff's own doctor established that his seizures posed a risk of harm in operating the various
Although plaintiff presented
appliances in the restaurant's kitchen.7
evidence that he had worked around the same appliances without incident
for previous employers, the court of appeals held that "one employer's
willingness to bear the risk of harm does not constitute evidence rendering
liable under the ADA for their refusal to bear that same
other employers
9
27

risk."

In Taylor v. Food World, Inc.,' plaintiff worked as a utility clerk for
Food World. He suffered from Asperger's disorder, a form of autism. As
a result of this condition, plaintiff would often speak more loudly than
necessary and tended to make inappropriate comments or ask personal
questions of customers. Plaintiff was eventually terminated by the store
manager, assertedly based on customer complaints.2"' In response to
plaintiff's subsequent suit under the ADA, the district court granted
summary judgment, finding that plaintiff was not an "otherwise qualified
On appeal, Food World argued that
individual" under the ADA. 2
interacting appropriately with customers was an essential job function
The
because plaintiff's position required frequent customer contact. 2
court of appeals did not question this basic proposition, but focused on
evidence in the record that various employees observed plaintiff interacting
with customers without a problem and never witnessed any comThe court of appeals found that although plaintiff admittedly
plaints.'
asked customers questions, an issue of fact remained on whether customers
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found the questions "offensive or inappropriate."' Accordingly, summary judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for trial.'
One case during the survey period related to an employer's "reasonable
accommodation" obligation under the ADA."
In Terrell v. USAir,'
plaintiff worked as a reservations sales agent for USAir. In this position,
she was required to sit at a computer terminal and type constantly on a
keyboard as she took calls from people making inquiries or seeking to make
ffight arrangements. Plaintiff filed both a workers' compensation claim and
an ADA action, alleging that she had developed carpal tunnel syndrome
because of her job.'
As to the ADA claim, the district court granted
summary judgment for USAir.'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
focused on whether USAir had met its reasonable accommodation
obligation under the ADA. Citing its prior decision in Willis v. Conopco,
Inc.,"9 the court reiterated that it is plaintiff's burden to identify an
accommodation allowing plaintiff to perform his or her job and to establish
that the accommodation is reasonable.'
Plaintiff argued that USAir had
failed to reasonably accommodate her by (1) not allowing her to work parttime; and (2) unreasonably delaying in providing her with a drop keyboard. 2"
As to the part-time position, the Eleventh Circuit noted
evidence establishing that no part-time reservations agent positions existed
during the relevant time period and found, as a matter of law, that USAir
had no duty to create a part-time position to accommodate plaintiff.'
The court held, "Whether a company will staff itself with part-time
workers, full-time workers, or a mix of both is a core management policy
with which the ADA was not intended to interfere.' 9 As to the drop
keyboard issue, the evidence established there was a delay of approximately three months in providing a drop keyboard, but plaintiff had some access
to a drop keyboard in the interim.'
The court of appeals agreed that
this delay was not unreasonable as a matter of law and that the employer
had met its accommodation obligation.'
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Two cases in the survey period addressed the issue of the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV") in the context of the ADA. The first case
is the landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court in Bragdon
v. Abbott.'
This case marked the High Court's first opportunity to
address either HIV status or the ADA. Although the case was brought
under Title III of the ADA (governing public accommodations), the decision
will have a large impact on employment cases brought under Title I of the
ADA. The facts of the case were relatively simple. Randon Bragdon, a
Bangor, Maine dentist, refused to fill the cavity of an H1V-positive patient
in his office. The patient had no symptoms, but had alerted Abbott of her
HIV-positive status when she filled out a medical form prior to her
appointment. Bragdon told the patient that he would treat her, but that
under his infectious disease policy he would only fill the cavity in a
hospital, which was located about one hour from his office. He told her
that he would charge her no more than his regular rate for filling a cavity,
but she would be responsible for the extra hospital expenses. The patient
refused this alternative and instead brought suit under the ADA.'
When the case finally made its way to the Supreme Court, three issues
were presented: (1) whether asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability
under the ADA, (2) whether reproduction is a major life activity for
purposes of the ADA, and (3) if so, whether there was a substantial limit
on the major life activity'
With respect to the first question, despite
the fact that plaintiff's disease was in the asymptomatic phase, the Court
had little difficulty in finding that HIV infection constitutes a disability
from the moment of infection. 0 1 The Court focused much attention on
the medical evidence, which established that the virus immediately began
to damage the infected person's white blood cells even though there were
no obvious or outward symptoms at this stage of the disease. The Court
concluded just as easily that reproduction and child bearing constitute a
major life activity for purposes of the ADA. 3 2 With little discussion the
Court simply concluded, "Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself."' Finally, the Court concluded that plaintiffs HIV status constituted a substantial limitation on the
major life activity of reproduction. 304 Reaching this conclusion, the Court
focused on the medical evidence that a woman infected with HIV who tries
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to conceive a child imposes a significant risk of infection both on the man
and the child. Although the Court noted that conception and childbirth
were not impossible for an HIV victim, the Act was found to require only
"substantial limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities."3 5

3 °6
In the second HIV case, Doe v. Dekalb County School District, 0

plaintiff, a teacher infected with HIV, taught children with significant
behavioral disorders. The children enrolled in plaintiff's classes were often
aggressive, frequently engaging in acts of violence, such as biting, hitting,
scratching, and kicking. There was also evidence of attempts to bring
dangerous items such as razors to school and attempted attacks on
classmates or teachers. Upon learning of plaintiff's infection, the school
district attempted to transfer plaintiff to a different teaching position
because of its fear that plaintiff could have "blood-to-blood contact with one
of his sometimes-violent students," and thereby transmit HIV. 7 Plaintiff
brought suit under the ADA, and the district court granted a permanent
injunction blocking the transfer.3" On appeal, however, the Eleventh
Circuit vacated the injunction.3" Initially, the court of appeals found the
district court had not made any factual finding to support its conclusion
that the risk of HIV infection was only "remote and theoretical."1 ° The
court of appeals also remanded the issue of whether the school district's
attempted lateral transfer constituted an "adverse employment action" for
purposes of the ADA.3 11 In its decision, the court adopted an objective
test as opposed to a subjective standard; i.e., whether a reasonable person
in plaintiff's position would have viewed the transfer as adverse.1
Accordingly, plaintiff's subjective preference for a psycho-education position
was not deemed relevant. 13 However, transfer to the new position would
have required plaintiff to complete ten credit hours (over three years) to
obtain certification in the new teaching position. The issue on remand was
to be whether a reasonable person in plaintiff's position would have
considered this requirement adverse." 4
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B. Coverage
In Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water ConservationDistrict,"'
the Eleventh Circuit, in a case of first impression, considered whether Title
II of the ADA encompasses claims for employment discrimination against
public entities. Plaintiff originally had brought suit under Title I of the
ADA, but that claim was dismissed because defendant did not have the
requisite number of employees to be covered under Title I. Plaintiff then
amended his complaint to bring an employment discrimination claim under
Title IU.31 However, the district court found that Title II did not encompass employment discrimination claims and granted summary judgment
for defendant.3" 7 On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed.
After reviewing the statutory language, the Department of Justice
regulations, and decisions of other courts, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that 31
Title
H clearly encompasses claims of public employment discrimina8

tion.

C. Sovereign Immunity
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,319 also discussed above in the
context of the ADEA, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether states and
their agencies are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment with
respect to claims brought under the ADA. The court reached the opposite
conclusion regarding the ADA than it reached with respect to the ADEA.
Again, applying the criteria enunciated by the United States Supreme
32 ° the Eleventh Circuit
Court in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
found that the ADA, unlike the ADEA, includes a clear statement of
Congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity: "'A
State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment."'321 The only
remaining issue, then, was to examine whether the ADA had been properly
enacted under Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers.
The court, agreeing with other circuits on this issue, had little difficulty in
concluding
that Congress had properly invoked its Fourteenth Amendment
3
power.
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D. Pre-SuitArbitration
In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,3s2 the United States
Supreme Court was presented with whether a general arbitration clause
in a collective bargaining agreement requires an employee to utilize the
arbitration procedure in lieu of bringing a court action under the ADA. It
was hoped that this decision would resolve the dichotomy between the
Court's 1974 decision, Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 2' and its 1991
decision, some seventeen years later, in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane
Corp. 2
A split in the circuits had developed over whether Gilmer
applies in the collective bargaining context. However, despite recognizing
that there was "obviously some tension" between Gardner-Denver and
Gilmer, the Court, unfortunately, did little to resolve the conflict. 28
Finding no presumption of arbitrability, the Court held, that any unionnegotiated waiver of employees' statutory right to bring claims of employment discrimination in a judicial forum, at a minimum, had to be clear and
unmistakable." 7 However, the Court stopped short of holding that a
clear and unmistakable waiver would be enforceable, finding only that the
collective bargaining agreement at issue contained no such waiver."
IV.
A

CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS OF 1866

Section 1981

In Lee v. Hughes,"2 the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a federal
employee has a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (section
1981)330 against individuals acting under color of federal law (as opposed
to state law)."' To answer this question, the court did not need to look
farther than the clear language of the statute itself. The court concluded,
"accordingly, the language of § 1981 is clear: Section 1981 provides a cause
of action for individuals subjected to discrimination by private actors and
discrimination under color of state law, but does not provide a cause of
action for discrimination under color of federal law."3 2
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In Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehabilitation Hospital,' the Eleventh
Circuit addressed whether a retaliation claim against an employer is
available under section 1981. The only issue before the court was whether
such a remedy was available in light of the Civil Rights Act of 199 1,m
which inter alia amended the language of section 1981 in an attempt to
overturn the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Pattersonv. McLean
Credit Union.'
Joining the conclusion reached by numerous district
courts, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that section 1981 does, indeed, cover
post-hiring retaliation claims arising after the 1991 Act.'
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